Table of Contents
This is a mixture of information based on what I’ve read on how the US, USSR and China recruit agents. China, naturally, is a bit of a different animal because they tend to insert Chinese nationals directly and rely less on recruiting agents although that’s begun to change over the past decade as the begin recruiting more technical professionals, politicians and university professors. China has become especially aggressive in recruiting agents at every level of government from city councils all the way to congressmen. Adam Swalwell, for example, is a well known example of a politician who’s campaign was run and funded by the CCP and who had a romantic relationship with his CCP handler.
Terminology check
Officer refers to the employee of the intelligence agency doing the recruitment.
Agent & spy refer to the person recruited by the officer to steal secret information and turn it over to the officer.
SADRAT: The Agent Recruitment Cycle (ARC)
SADRAT is the mnemonic device used to describe the process used to recruit agents. Spot, Assess, Develop, Recruit, Agent (Running) and Terminate.
Spotting
Spotting is the initial stage of recruitment. In this stage an officer is looking for people who have access to the information that the government needs or have access to engage in the direct actions that the government desires. The officer is surveying identifying where the secret information stored, often with the help of analysts, and is identifying which individuals will have access to it.
During this stage of the process an officer may recruit what’s known as an “Access Agent” or “Principal Agent.” These are agents who will never engage in theft of information or direct action themselves but are well connected or well positioned to identify those who could. These access agents are always well connected and involved in the local community in some way.
Access agents can be anything from wealthy movers and shakers to industry influencers to college professors to the local seamstress or barber outside of a military base. Anyone who knows and talks to people who work with the secret information desired. Access agents can be well rewarded, sometimes even moreso than agents who are actually stealing the secrets.
Assessing
One a potential agent has been spotted, the work begins to determine if he does indeed have access to the secret information, if he’ll be a reliable agent, if he’s involved with or drawn the attention of counter-intelligence or law enforcement, if he’s involved with other foreign intelligence services and if he’ll even be amiable to the approach.
In this stage you also want to determine if the potential agent is a climber — that is, someone who wants more. If someone’s too high status already they may not be interested in what you have to offer. Identifying the the motivations for why someone would consider spying is key before approaching them.
Assessment is a “stage” in SADRAT but it’s continuous over the entire relationship. The background check should be continuous, every meeting should be an opportunity to gain further insight into the motivations and vulnerabilities of the agent. Open sources (OSINT) should be monitored for all mentions of the agent.
One should be particularly cautious of walk-ins. An ideal situation is one where the officer has spotted and assessed the potential agent. Someone who first approaches the agent or agency should be turned away completely or at a minimum viewed and treated with extreme supiscion.
Developing
If the potential recruit is assessed to have the correct access, be amiable to the approach and not be a threat to the officer then the officer by begin developing the potential agent.
During this phase the officer befriends the potential agent without hinting that he is a member of an intelligence service. The goal is to learn more about the potential agent while developing a strong, trust-based personal relationship.
If a direct introduction is too challenging then the access agent may arrange the meeting between the officer and the potential agent. If that’s too risky then the access agent may use a “cut out” (a third party) to arrange the introduction.
Beyond simply building the relationship, the officer slowly brings the agent into the world of espionage without him realizing it. This starts off with asking him to do minor, innocuous things that are completely legal and over the course of months slowly accustoms the potential agent into handing over information to the officer. Every time information is handed over the officer will praise and reward the potential agent hansomely.
It’s important to bring amenities to every meeting no matter where it’s held, even if it’s just a bottle of water. Not only does this continue to generate gratitude but giving someone a drink or a bite to eat calms the nerves and suppresses the fight or flight instinct. We’re genetically coded to eat and drink only when we’re calm and feel safe so providing food and drink can take advantage of this instinct.
It’s during this period that the officer may also begin helping the potential recruit with small, innocuous needs like getting a visa, closing a business deal or otherwise “pushing through the paperwork because I know a guy.” This creates recipricol goodwill and also creates a sense that the agent’s new friend is someone with authority and influence.
Towards the end of the developmental period the officer may start asking the potential agent to start meeting at increasingly odd hours or increasingly odd places. Towards the very end of the development state the officer may ask for secret but innocuous information while simultaneously providing the agent with an explanation that lets him rationalize it away.
Scientists and academics are particularly easy targets because they exist in a culture that (at least used to) cross cultural boundaries and manufactures both a naivite about the world and a jadedness about the US. The Russians and Chinese exploited this with great success by concentrating on sympathy for elements of American society that were perceived as persecuted.
Recruiting
This is generally regarded as the most dangerous stage of the SADRAT process. The Recruiting stage is where the officer reveals his true job – an operative of an intelligence service – and converts the relationship from a personal one into a professional one.
This can be dangerous because the potential agent may become enraged and violent. He may also flee and go either to the police or to the counter-intelligence service. Because of this the officer must have a plans to calm the situation, defend himself against violence and also have an extraction plan in place if his cover is blown by the potential agent reporting him.
It’s during this phase that negotiations take place in terms of what the agent wants and what information or direct action the officer wants. If the agent has built a good relationship with the agent and if the agent is correctly incentivizing the agent (see MICE, below) then after a very emotional, stressful discussion the agent is likely to begin spying.
At this point incentives become paramount as the relationship shift into a professional one. It’s important to have a deep understanding of what is motivating the agent and important to project one’s own cultural drives onto an agent. For example, Americans are very motivated to spy by money. Russians, on the other hand, are very motivated revenge (“My father was killed as a political prisoner; I want revenge on the state.”).
Lastly, it’s important to make the agent feel safe. Continually re-enforce the idea that the agency has kept him safe so far and that they will continue to do so.
Agent, Running the Agent
During this stage the officer who recruited the agent is still handling the agent. This stage can go on for years or longer. It’s during this period that the officer trains the agent in tradecraft, teaching him to steal increasingly more important secret information and to do so in a safer, less risky manner.
It’s important to maintain a collegial, friendly relationship with the agent but also to keep it professional and not personal. The officer should continue doing favors and go out of his way to keep the relationship positive but the ultimate goal is to shift the agent’s alliance from the officer to the intelligence agency.
Terminating the relationship
The final stage is terminating the relationship or more accurately, terminating the personal relationship. This is the final stage where an agent is transferred to a different officer for handling. If this goes smoothly then the agent’s loyalty is fully shifted from the officer to the intelligence agency. It changes from “I’m Bob’s friend and working for him.” to “I’m a CIA man.”
MICE – What motivates a spy
MICE is another mnemonic device that describes the motivations for spying – Money, Ideology, Compromise and or Ego. None of these categories are mutually exclusive and in fact, the ideal situation is one in which there are multiple motivations. Several case officers have said that the ideal motivational mix is 2/3s ideology, 1/3 money.
It’s important to remember here that while MICE describes the motivations of a spy, the relationship between an agent and his handler is what drives and steers the collection of secret information. A negative or rocky relationship will result in poor quality information, incorrect information or may even lead to the termination of the relationship despite motivators. Think of it this way: At some point people leave toxic corporate cultures despite golden handcuffs. Officers create the corporate culture experienced by the agent.
Agents may also shift motivations over time. It’s important to keep reevaluating an agent’s motives and identify when they’re shifting so that you can continue providing the right kind of motivation.
Money
This is probably the most obvious motivator. Paying for information is obvious and it greases the wheels of all other motivators. General consensus is that money should be paid to every agent even if it’s not the key motivator. The amounts paid to spies are usually smaller than you would expect. Very few spies get big pay days.
For theft of technical secrets the amount is usually commensurate with the amount of R&D dollars it will save. Critical intentions intel typically pays the most.
Don’t have blinders on and think of money as only money. Think of it as transactional. Compensation can be in the form of citizenship, getting kids into good colleges or other favors.
A cautionary note: If an agent is being paid large sums then services to help him conceal the nature and source of the money should also be provided. An abrupt, unexplainable increase in wealth can draw the attention of law enforcement and counter-intelligence. It’s also useful to have the agent sign a receipt. It doesn’t matter what the sign with – fake name or even just an X. The action of signing something helps pull them deeper into world of espionage psychologically.
Be aware too that the agent who’s selling you information is likely also selling that same information to other intelligence agencies.
Ideology
Ideologically motivated agents are generally viewed as the most reliable and favored agents. They’re not acting just out of self interest but are acting out of an interest that they view as shared by the agency that they’re spying for. It’s important to continually reenforce the ideological alignment between the agent and the agency when meeting.
The downside to an ideologically motivated agent is that they’re only as motivated as their own convictions. If their morale drops, if the begin to feel that the agency’s conventions don’t match their own or if their convictions falter then the agent will become less productive and may even end the relationship.
In an ideal world ideological alignment is 100% between the agency and the agent. However, ideological alignment can also be thought of as people who were previously true believers but became disenchanted. “I wanted this…but I didn’t want it like this!” is a powerful motivator and a common motivator of agents who turn on subversive or terrorist organizations — they agree with goals, morals and ethics of the group but not the actions taken or the way the organization functions.
Coercion & Compromise
This is the method of motivation most commonly used by the FBI and law enforcement. The hang the threat of prosecution and jail time over a person’s head and then offer immunity if the agent agrees to spy. This can generally be thought of as blackmail in all it’s forms.
The risks of coercion are immense. There’s very little opportunity to have a good relationship with an agent created out of coercion. The agent will always be looking to terminate the relationship and always be looking to do the minimum. Furthermore, the “asks” of the officer must always be less than the penalty that the agent would suffer should the blackmail come to light.
Coercion is best used for short term agents who won’t be run for very long. The longer an agent created through coercion is run, the greater the danger of the agent compromising the officer.
Ego
Ego can be a powerful motivator. Ego is representative of the internal motivations of an agent – they can be positive or negative. Some agents are motivated by testing boundaries and seeing what they can get away with. Others are motivated out of resentment or a desire for retaliation.
A database administrator may be motivated to steal secrets in order to see what he can get away with and prove to himself that he’s smarter than his corporation’s cyber security team. He may just see it as a way to spice his life up a little bit.
On the flip side of the coin, an army officer who was passed over for promotion may be motivated to spy in order to punish the military for being passed over.
Structuring the spy ring
There are multiple ways to structure a spy ring. For most spying purposes, an official cover agent will be the touch point for all agents that they’re running. When an agent’s under non-official cover, the agent may make more use of cut-outs and either chain or cell structures.
When an agent’s using a cut-out, they’re sending out a third party that represents them to recruit and run agents on their behalf. Fundamentally the cut-out is doing the job that the officer would normally do while the officer is acting as a sort of station chief. This helps protect the identity of the officer which is essential when working under nonofficial cover since in that circumstance the officer does not enjoy diplomatic protection.
Spy chains
To the best of my knowledge this is an older method of organization which isn’t used anymore since it requires every recruited agent to also recruit another agent. In this method of organization an agent is recruited, then that agent is tasked with two jobs – recruiting another agent and stealing secrets. Dual tasking agents is rarely effective and thus this method of organization has fallen by the wayside.
One variation of the spy chain which is slightly more successful is to recruit an agent. Then have that agent recruit two agents. One to steal secrets and one to recruit two more people and repeat the process. The advantage of this is that it can create a lot of agents with very few of them having direct knowledge of who the actual officer is. The disadvantage of this is that it’s nearly impossible for the officer to direct agents further down the chain and it’s equally challenging for stolen information to be communicated up the chain.
Spy cells
Generally it’s best for agents not to know of each other’s existence. However, there are some secrets that may require agents to work together in order to steal…or direct actions that require agents to work together. These agents can either be individually recruited by the officer or one agent can bring in others that he trusts; typically with the understanding that the agent must never real the officer to the people he brings in.
In this case it’s best if the cell consists of a maximum of three people and that they are brought together to achieve a single specific goal, for examples stealing on particular piece of information. When that goal is achieved the cell is disbanded.
Officer-Agent relationship tips
Always appear confidence, competent and act as if you’re backed by a powerful organization. Be someone that inspires trust in your agent and make your agent believe that you have immense resources available to help him and to ensure his safety.
Be generous, always. Always bring amenities and be free with cash. Never dangle cash and then withdraw it.
Present espionage opportunities as scarce and fleeting. Make the agent feel like he’s lucky that you’re offering him this opportunity and that if he declines he will be missing out on something incredible.
Frame the relationship in terms of what he wants, not in terms of the information you need to collect. The agent should feel that it’s about him.
The officer’s authority should be implicit not explicit. Your authority should define the objectives and resources but the agent should be willing and uncoerced into engaging in the operation. Threatening to withhold incentives or resources will kill an officer-agent relationship.
Like your agent and find common ground even if you would normally despise the agent. Humans like people who like them…so find a way to like your agent no matter what.
Measures of influence with an agent
- Does an agent fully disclose subsources of information?
- Has an agent attempted to established limits to subjects he will and will not report about?
- Is an agent willing to admit when he does not know about a topic and will he take reasonable risks to gain that information?
- Is an agent knowingly providing information that would get him in trouble if discovered?
- How closely does an agent adhere to the directions a case officer gives concerning methods of collecting information and moving to and from meetings?